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Governors and Privacy

A call can be cut off from two places:

  1. StandIn-side - StandIn enforces the caller’s tier limits and, at cutoff, asks the bridge to wind the call down. The bridge forwards the goodbye request to the agent on teams.goodbye.
  2. Bridge-side (MAX_CALL_MINUTES) - an independent hard cap you set on the bridge. LiveKit doesn’t know about your billing, so this is your own backstop against a call that runs forever.

Both funnel through the same goodbye path; the first to fire wins, and a duplicate goodbye is ignored.

There is no bridge-side TTS on the room transport - the bridge cannot synthesize speech into the room. So the governor’s goodbye is a teams.goodbye data message carrying the text; your agent speaks it. The sequence on MAX_CALL_MINUTES:

  1. The bridge arms a hard deadline (GOODBYE_GRACE_MS + headroom) so nothing can wedge the call past its limit.
  2. It sends teams.goodbye to the agent.
  3. It waits GOODBYE_GRACE_MS for the agent to speak, then ends the call.

Because the bridge can’t know your agent’s real speech duration, GOODBYE_GRACE_MS (default 8 s) is the budget. If the agent’s current turn outlasts the grace, the goodbye can be cut - so have your teams.goodbye handler interrupt the current turn and speak the line with interruptions disabled (see Agents and Dispatch).

  • No recording, no persistence. This bridge stores nothing. Audio is relayed frame-by-frame between the worker socket and the room and never written to disk. recording.status is logged only.
  • Caller identity is minimal and defaulted. The agent receives caller_name, tenant_id, call_direction, and user_id (AAD id) - and user_id is included only when Teams provides one, so it is never a shared placeholder. Nullable fields default to safe strings, never null.
  • Metrics carry no call content. GET /metrics exposes counters (calls, durations, rejects, relay/drop counts) only - never audio, text, or identities.
  • The room is deleted at teardown (LIVEKIT_DELETE_ROOM_ON_END=true), so the agent job ends immediately and no room lingers with call context.

The transport carries the same protections as the sibling bridges: replay-proof single-use HMAC upgrade, connection caps checked before crypto, payload caps, a pre-start timeout, dead-peer detection, duplicate-call 409, a pre-auth crash guard, and a graceful SIGTERM drain. See Architecture for how each fits into the call flow.